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A VAGUE LAW IN A SMARTPHONE WORLD:
LIMITING THE SCOPE OF UNAUTHORIZED
ACCESS UNDER THE COMPUTER FRAUD
AND ABUSE ACT
ANDREW T. HERNACKI

*

The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) broadly criminalizes unauthorized
access to computers and digital information, but how far should these federal
prohibitions reach into the mobile data space? As smartphones and mobile
applications continually redefine the digital landscape, attempts to apply the decadesold anti-hacking statute in this new territory have created potentially disturbing
precedent.
Courts and critics have struggled to interpret the arguably vague and ambiguous
provisions of the CFAA and have turned to contract law, agency law, and computer
science for guidance. This Comment contends that the contract- and agency-based
interpretations implicate constitutional vagueness concerns, and the code-based
approach does not sufficiently address “insider” misuse of information. In the context
of mobile application data privacy, the shortcomings of current interpretations
necessitate a narrower view of unauthorized access. By limiting liability to only
traditional notions of hacking and serious misuse of information, the CFAA can better
serve its original and primary purpose: punishing criminal computer hackers and
those who abuse legitimate access rights.
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“I think there is a world market for maybe five computers.”
–Thomas Watson, Chairman of IBM, 1943
INTRODUCTION
1

Cell phones are ubiquitous.
As handheld devices become
increasingly affordable and network service providers continue to
1. According to the wireless industry trade association, CTIA, the wireless
penetration rate, which measures the total active devices over the total U.S.
population, reached 102.4% in 2011. Wireless Quick Facts, CELLULAR TELECOMMS.
INDUS. ASS’N, http://www.ctia.org/advocacy/research/index.cfm/aid/10323 (last
visited May 5, 2012).
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expand cellular and data bandwidth, advanced mobile devices, or
2
smartphones, have become similarly widespread. According to one
recent study by the Pew Research Center, eighty-eight percent of
Americans own some kind of cell phone, while forty-six percent of
3
Americans own a smartphone. One of the most common and
distinctive features of today’s smartphones is mobile applications, or
“apps.” Apple’s often-quoted and parodied advertising slogan,
“there’s an app for that,” seemingly encapsulates the current panoply
4
of apps across numerous genres available to smartphone users. With
the meteoric rise of smartphones and app usage over the last few
5
years, concerns over data privacy in the mobile space have garnered
6
7
similar attention from legislators, regulators, and the general
8
public.
Despite increasing legislative and media attention on mobile data
privacy, many app developers have not adopted self-regulatory
9
measures to protect user privacy.
A recent Wall Street Journal
investigation of the 101 most popular mobile apps on the market
10
revealed that forty-five did not include privacy policies of any kind.
2. See 2010 Mobile Year in Review Report, COMSCORE (Feb. 14, 2011),
http://www.comscore.com/Press_Events/Presentations_Whitepapers/2011/2010_M
obile_Year_in_Review (describing consistent growth in percentages of web-enabled
phones, unlimited data plans, smartphone ownership, and 3G/4G phone
ownership).
3. Aaron Smith, 46% of American Adults Are Smartphone Owners, PEW RESEARCH
CTR. (Mar. 1, 2012), http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2012/
Smartphone%20ownership%202012.pdf.
4. Perhaps in response to widespread parody, Apple recently obtained a
trademark for “there’s an app for that.” THERE’S AN APP FOR THAT, Registration
No. 3,884,408.
5. Press Release, Apple, Inc., Apple’s App Store Downloads Top 25 Billion
(Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2012/03/05Apples-App-StoreDownloads-Top-25-Billion.html.
6. See, e.g., Protecting Mobile Privacy: Your Smartphones, Tablets, Cell Phones, and
Your Privacy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Privacy, Tech. & the Law of the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 1 (2011) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, S.
Comm. on the Judiciary) (“The collection, use and storage of location and other
sensitive personal information [from mobile devices] has serious implications
regarding the privacy rights and personal safety of American consumers.”).
7. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF
RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS (2012),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf (proposing
new privacy frameworks for mobile companies).
8. See, e.g., Press Release, Apple, Inc., supra note 5 (discussing public comments
regarding concerns for better privacy protection).
9. See Tanzina Vega, Industry Tries to Streamline Privacy Policies for Mobile Users, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 14, 2011, at B7 (describing one company’s effort to solve the problem of
non-existent and confusing mobile privacy policies by creating a tool that generates
boilerplate privacy policies for app developers).
10. Scott Thurm & Yukari Iwatani Kane, Your Apps are Watching You, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 18, 2010, at C1. In response to this study, California Attorney General Kamala
Harris conducted an investigation and recently reached an agreement with Apple,
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Moreover, fifty-six apps transmitted the unique device identification
11
(UDID), a serial-like number that can be linked to other user data,
12
to third-party companies without the users’ awareness or consent.
Amidst these growing concerns over protecting users’ information,
both law enforcement and private citizens have looked for new ways
13
to bring their concerns before the judiciary. Some of these novel
approaches, however, may push the envelope too far.
App users alleging privacy infringement have recently sought
14
redress under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), a federal
criminal statute originally designed to combat “juvenile computer
15
hacker” attacks against the federal government’s computers.
Despite the statute’s narrow origin, the CFAA now broadly
criminalizes and permits private civil actions against anyone who
“intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds
authorized access, and thereby obtains . . . (C) information from any
16
protected computer.” Typical criminal and civil cases under the
17
CFAA involve traditional notions of hacking government computers,
18
stealing trade secrets to establish competing businesses, or large-

Google, and several other big players in the mobile space to amend the companies’
policies regarding privacy policies. Geoffrey A. Fowler, Tech Giants Agree on Deal on
Privacy Policies for Apps, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2012, at B4. Notably, Attorney General
Harris’s investigation revealed that twenty-two of the thirty most downloaded apps
still lacked privacy policies. Id.
11. Modern smartphones are equipped with this identification number that
cannot be deleted from the device. Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Unique Phone ID
Numbers
Explained,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Dec.
19,
2010,
9:40
PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2010/12/19/unique-phone-id-numbers-explained.
Although the numbers by themselves do not identify any personal information about
the user, the primary concern with these identifiers is that they could potentially be
tied to other user metadata, including geo-location data or user-account data, to
create a personally-identifiable profile of the user. Id.
12. Thurm & Kane, supra note 10.
13. See infra notes 20–21 and accompanying text (describing pending
investigations and class action cases stemming from mobile app data privacy
concerns); see also Cyber Crime: Updating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to Protect
Cyber Space and Combat Emerging Threats: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
112th Cong. 1 (2011) (statement of James A. Baker, Associate Deputy Att’y Gen.)
(proposing further expansion of the CFAA by increasing criminal penalties and
making it easier for prosecutors to bring cases against individuals and coconspirators).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006).
15. Sarah Boyer, Note, Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Abusing Federal Jurisdiction?,
6 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 661, 665 (2009).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2).
17. See United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 505, 511 (2d Cir. 1991) (affirming
the criminal conviction of a Cornell student who used a school computer to crash
university, governmental, and military servers around the country).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Nosal, No. 10-10038, 2012 WL 1176119, at *1 (9th
Cir. Apr. 10, 2012) (en banc) (describing the section of the CFAA that criminalizes
theft of confidential documents and trade secrets).
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20

scale data theft via malicious code or “botnets.” Law enforcement
21
and classes of app users, however, now argue that app developers
and mobile advertisers can be liable under the CFAA when an app
merely obtains information from the user’s smartphone for targeted
22
advertisements and marketing analytics. The CFAA does not define
what it means to access a computer without authorization, and courts
23
continue to struggle to interpret these vague provisions.
This Comment will argue that, in the context of mobile app data
privacy cases, broad interpretations of the CFAA’s unauthorized
access provisions violate the vagueness doctrine and render the
statute unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause. As the
vagueness doctrine enables courts to adopt narrow interpretations of
vague statutes, courts should limit application of the CFAA to

19. See, e.g., Indictment at 15–16, 26–27, United States v. Ancheta, No. CR 051060 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (charging defendant with CFAA violations for operating and
profiting from a botnet—an army of infected computers—used to send malicious
spam and conduct distributed denial of service attacks against various websites),
available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/cyberlaw/usanchetaind.pdf.
20. See Pandora Media, Inc., Amendment No. 2 to Registration Statement Under
the Securities Act of 1933, at 27–28 (Apr. 4, 2011), http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/1230276/000119312511087171/ds1a.htm#toc119636_19 (disclosing that
federal prosecutors are investigating the use of app-obtained information as
potentially violative of the CFAA); Amir Efrati et al., Mobile-App Makers Face U.S.
Privacy Investigation, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 2011, at B1 (discussing an investigation by
federal prosecutors in New Jersey into mobile app data collection and disclosure).
21. See In re iPhone Application Litig., No. 11-MD-02250-LHK, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 106865, at *35–37 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011) (alleging CFAA violations against
Apple and several mobile advertisers for the unauthorized acquisition of apps,
smartphone UDIDs, and geo-location data for marketing and advertising purposes);
Hines v. Openfeint, Inc., No. CV113084, 2011 WL 2471471 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2011)
(alleging that a mobile-gaming-network company accessed, without authorization,
users’ smartphone UDIDs, Facebook/Twitter profiles, and other purportedly
personal information for marketing analytics and targeted advertising profiles); In re
Google Android Consumer Privacy Litig., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1373 (J.P.M.L. 2011)
(consolidating six cases arising out of allegations of Google’s “improper business
practices”); see also Complaint ¶¶ 39–44, Jeffreys v. Google, Inc., No. 9:2011cv80676
(S.D. Fla. June 9, 2011), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/districtcourts/florida/flsdce/9:2011cv80676/380889/1 (alleging that Google, through its
Android mobile operating system, acquired personal information from users’
smartphones without authorization, in violation of the CFAA).
22. Hines, 2011 WL 2471471, at *10–12.
23. Some courts have resolved such ambiguities by invalidating overly-broad
language and substituting narrower interpretations, applying the “vagueness
doctrine.” Statutes that are so vague they are indecipherable to the public are
especially prime for application of the doctrine. See Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope:
Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1596, 1619–28 (2003) (comparing “virtual-world” and “physical-world”
interpretations of “access” and “authorization”). Professor Kerr also notes that “the
few courts to have interpreted access have reached inconsistent conclusions” and
“[c]ourts have faced even greater difficulties trying to interpret the meaning of
authorization.” Id. at 1628.
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prohibit only traditional notions of hacking and serious misuse of
information.
Part I explains the early development of the CFAA as an antihacking statute, the current scope of activities triggering liability
under the statute, and the three leading interpretations of
unauthorized access. Part II argues that broad interpretations of
unauthorized access in the context of mobile apps can render the
CFAA unconstitutionally void for vagueness. Part III analyzes how
courts should limit application of the CFAA to cases of traditional
hacking and misuse of information. This Comment concludes that,
except for instances of hacking or serious misuse of information,
mobile app data privacy cases are improper under the CFAA,
especially in light of proposed privacy-specific rules and legislation.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. Evolution of the CFAA
The initial goal of the CFAA was modest: protect information
stored on computers owned by the federal government from damage
24
and theft by outside intruders. As the computer industry continues
to expand and the threat of hackers pervades virtually every
interaction with the digital world, this formerly-little-known antihacking statute has grown into a multi-faceted tool with a potentially
25
limitless scope.
1.

Initial enactment and early development of the CFAA
Over the last three decades, the CFAA has evolved considerably
from its initial enactment. The CFAA’s first iteration was enacted as
26
part of the omnibus Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984
27
(CCCA), which included the first federal computer crime statute.
The CCCA introduced three new federal computer crimes designed
24. COMPUTER CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, CRIMINAL DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES 1 (2007) [hereinafter PROSECUTING
COMPUTER CRIMES] (citing H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 6 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689, 3692), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/
docs/ccmanual.pdf.
25. See id. at 2–3 (describing the steady expansion of causes of action under the
CFAA through numerous amendments over the last twenty-five years).
26. Pub. L. NO. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030
(2006)).
27. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 6, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3692
(recognizing the absence of federal computer crime legislation and acknowledging
how, prior to this enactment, law enforcement relied primarily on wire- and mailfraud statutes to attempt to combat computer crimes committed with computers); see
also PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES, supra note 24, at 1 (discussing same).
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to protect the burgeoning universe of federal systems controlled by
28
and stored on computers. While all of the new offenses applied to a
person who “knowingly accesses a computer without authorization, or
having accessed a computer with authorization, uses the opportunity
such access provides for purposes to which such authorization does
29
not extend,” each provision criminalized conduct affecting a distinct
federal interest.
The first offense created under the CCCA prohibited accessing a
computer to obtain national security information that could be used
30
to injure the United States.
The second portion of the CCCA
criminalized accessing a computer to obtain sensitive information
31
from a financial institution or consumer-reporting agency. Finally,
the CCCA criminalized accessing a computer if such conduct would
affect the government’s use of that computer or government
32
operations.
These new provisions sought to protect national
33
defense, financial information, and the use of government property.
Congress’s first attempt at creating a unified computer crime
statute, however, was limited to only harm resulting from
unauthorized access. Accordingly, the statute left two significant
regulatory gaps: (1) the statute did not cover individuals who caused
harm with authorized access; and (2) it failed to address access by
34
proxy or a co-conspirator. To remedy these loopholes, Congress
amended § 1030 in 1986 to create the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act but limited it to only those crimes implicating a compelling
35
federal interest. The 1986 act attempted to remedy the misuse-oflegitimate-access problem by adding the phrase “exceeds authorized
access,” thereby criminalizing any access, including unknowing
access, which even minimally steps over the line of authorized

28. See Boyer, supra note 15, at 665–66 (noting that the CCCA was intended to
“protect only the most vital federal interests” and not to broadly criminalize
computer fraud affecting interstate commerce).
29. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1)–(3) (Supp. II 1985) (current version at 18 U.S.C. §
1030 (2006)).
30. See Boyer, supra note 15, at 665 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1)).
31. See id. at 665–66 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)).
32. See id. at 666 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(3)).
33. H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 6–7, 21–22 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3689, 3692, 3707. See generally Dodd S. Griffith, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of
1986: A Measured Response to a Growing Problem, 43 VAND. L. REV. 453 (1990)
(discussing scope and structure of the 1984 Act and summarizing policy
considerations behind both the 1984 act and the subsequent 1986 amendments).
34. Branden Darden, Note, Definitional Vagueness in the CFAA: Will Cyberbullying
Cause the Supreme Court to Intervene?, 13 SMU TECH. L. REV. 329, 331 (2009).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1988) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006)); see also
Darden, supra note 34, at 331–32.
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36

This small phrase would later prove to have widespread
access.
37
interpretive problems.
In 1994, Congress amended the CFAA to expand the statute
38
beyond the criminal sector and add a private right of action. This
civil analogue permits not only injunctive relief, but also equitable
39
relief for violations of the statute that result in damage or loss. This
change, in conjunction with additional amendments to §
40
1030(a)(5), shifted the focus of the statute from the technical ideas
of computer access to an individual’s intent and the scope of the
41
harm caused.
42
The Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA) continued the
expansion of the CFAA. While prior versions of the statute were
purposefully limited to unauthorized access of only federal-interest
43
information, such as financial records or national security data, the
EEA expanded the scope of § 1030(a)(2) to now include obtaining—
44
and simply reading —“any information of any kind so long as the
45
conduct involved an interstate or foreign communication.”
In
addition, the EEA added a new computer extortion provision,
bolstered various misdemeanor provisions with felony-triggering
conduct, and expanded the scope of “harm” to include non-monetary
46
damage such as “physical injury to any person.” Further, the EEA
replaced references to “federal interest” computers with a class of

36. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (1988) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (2006)).
37. See infra Part I.B (detailing three competing approaches to interpreting
unauthorized access).
38. Darden, supra note 34, at 332.
39. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (1994) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2006)).
40. The 1996 amendment to § 1030(a)(5) was intended “to further protect
computers and computer systems covered by the statute from damage both by
outsiders, who gain access to a computer without authorization, and by insiders, who
intentionally damage a computer.” S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 9–10 (1996), available at
1996 WL 492169, at *9; see also Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1566 (2010) (explaining that this amendment
expanded liability-triggering actions to include both accidental and non-negligent
damage to computers).
41. Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C.A. § 1030), 174 A.L.R. Fed. 101, 125–26
(2001).
42. Pub. L. NO. 104-294, tit. II, 110 Stat. 3488, 3491 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1030 (2006)).
43. Darden, supra note 34, at 331.
44. EEA tit. II, 110 Stat. at 3491.
45. Kerr, supra note 40, at 1567 (noting that Congress “effectively criminalized all
interstate hacking” with this amendment because even reading system prompts or
messages would reveal information to someone without authorized access).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (Supp. II 1996) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030
(2006)); see Kerr, supra note 40, at 1567.
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“protected computers,” a change that, as discussed below, would have
47
a dramatic impact on the scope of the statute.
2.

Current actions triggering liability under the CFAA
The current version of the CFAA provides for criminal and civil
liability when an individual intentionally “accesse[s] a computer
without authorization or exceed[s] authorized access” and engages in
48
one of seven types of prohibited conduct.
Section 1030(a)
proscribes these seven actions:
(1) obtaining any restricted
government information or information protected for reasons of
49
national defense; (2) using interstate communication to obtain any
50
information from any protected computer; (3) accessing a
51
computer owned or used by the federal government; (4)
fraudulently obtaining anything of value from a protected computer
52
unless the value is less than $5000 in a one-year period; (5)
53
damaging a protected computer or data stored therein; (6)
54
trafficking in passwords or similar information in certain situations;
and (7) threatening to cause damage or obtain information from a
protected computer with intent to extort money or anything of
55
value.
Section 1030(b) punishes any attempts or conspiracies to commit
the proscribed actions, while § 1030(c) outlines criminal sanctions,
and § 1030(d) authorizes the Secret Service and Federal Bureau of
56
Investigation to investigate violations of the prohibited conduct.
Section 1030(e) provides definitions of some statutory terms (with
some notable absences), and § 1030(f) exempts “lawfully authorized”
federal or state law enforcement or intelligence-related
57
investigations.
Section 1030(g) comprises the private right of action, specifically
providing that “[a]ny person who suffers damage or loss by reason of
a violation of this section may maintain a civil action against the
violator to obtain compensatory damages and injunctive relief or

47. See infra Part I.A.3 (discussing the virtually limitless scope of the CFAA’s
jurisdiction over computers connected to the Internet).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1)–(7) (2006).
49. Id. § 1030(a)(1).
50. Id. § 1030(a)(2).
51. Id. § 1030(a)(3).
52. Id. § 1030(a)(4).
53. Id. § 1030(a)(5).
54. Id. § 1030(a)(6).
55. Id. § 1030(a)(7).
56. Id. § 1030(b)–(d).
57. Id. § 1030(e)–(f).
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58

other equitable relief.” To bring an action for civil relief, a party
must establish two essential elements: (1) a violation of one of the
seven proscribed activities in § 1030(a) resulting in damage or loss,
and (2) a violation must involve one of the five aggravating factors
59
delineated in § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I)–(V).
Despite this somewhat
confusing statutory structure, a civil claim may be brought under any
of the delineated causes of action so long as the party demonstrates at
60
least one aggravating factor. The civil right of action also includes a
two-year statute of limitations period and bars product-liability claims
61
for negligent design or manufacture of a computer.
3.

Current scope of the CFAA
In 1996, Congress replaced the idea of a “federal interest”
62
computer with a new class of “protected computer.” The phrase
“protected computer” sparked some initial interpretive problems, but
it is now viewed very broadly. Currently, a “protected computer”
means a computer that is either
(A) exclusively for the use of a financial institution or the United
States Government . . . ; or (B) [] used in or affecting interstate or
foreign commerce or communication, including a computer
located outside the United States that is used in a manner that
affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the
63
United States.

This definition marked a significant change from the pre-1996 idea
of “federal interest” computers, which triggered liability under the
64
statute only when a violator “used” computers in two or more states.
58. Id. § 1030(g).
59. Id. The aggravating factors are:
(I) loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year period . . . aggregating at
least $5,000 in value; (II) the modification or impairment, or potential
modification or impairment, of the medical examination, diagnosis,
treatment, or care of 1 or more individuals; (III) physical injury to any
person; (IV) a threat to public health or safety; (V) damage affecting a
computer used by or for an entity of the United States Government in
furtherance of the administration of justice, national defense, or national
security.
Id. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I)–(V).
60. P.C. Yonkers, Inc. v. Celebrations the Party & Seasonal Superstore, LLC, 428
F.3d 504, 512 (3d Cir. 2005) (“We do not read section 1030(g)’s language that the
claim must involve one or more of the numbered subsections of subsection
[(c)(4)(A)(i)] as limiting relief to claims that are entirely based only on subsections
[(a)(5)(A)–(C)], but, rather, as requiring that claims brought under other sections
must meet, in addition, one of the five numbered [(c)(4)(A)(i)] ‘tests.’”).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2) (Supp. II 1996) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030
(2006)).
63. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(A)–(B) (2006).
64. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1987) (current version at 18 U.S.C.
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The current definition, with the inclusion of “or affecting interstate
or foreign commerce or communication,” effectively expands the
65
scope of the statute to mirror the breadth of the Commerce Clause.
Under current Commerce Clause jurisprudence, Congress can
regulate local economic activities so long as there is a rational basis
and the activities are among an economic class of activities that
66
substantially affect commerce, even in the aggregate. Accordingly,
the addition of the congressionally-recognized term of art “affecting”
within the definition of “protected computer” broadens the CFAA’s
reach to every computer that can be regulated under the Commerce
67
Clause. Recently, several federal courts of appeals have recognized
the broad reach of the CFAA as commensurate with Commerce
Clause jurisdiction and have accordingly rejected jurisdictional
68
challenges to CFAA enforcement actions.
69
Additionally, the CFAA’s definition includes foreign commerce,
stretching the definition of “protected computer” to the point where
70
it ostensibly just means “computer.” The CFAA, however, defines
“computer” very broadly and excludes only typewriters and hand-held

§ 1030 (2006)).
65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B) (2006); see Kerr, supra note
40, at 1569–71 (explaining that computers connected to the Internet need not be
used in interstate commerce to fall within the scope of the CFAA).
66. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 18–19 (2005) (holding that marijuana
is a fungible commodity, albeit an illegal one, such that Congress can regulate even
local cultivation because the aggregate effect of home growing could substantially
affect interstate commerce).
67. Kerr, supra note 40, at 1570; see also PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES, supra
note 24, at 2 (acknowledging that the scope of “protected computer” mirrors “the
full extent of Congress’s commerce power”).
68. See United States v. Trotter, 478 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2007) (rejecting a
constitutional challenge that the CFAA did not cover the computer network of the
not-for-profit Salvation Army, and explaining that the computers’ connection to the
Internet rendered them “part of ‘a system that is inexorably intertwined with
interstate commerce’ and thus properly within the realm of Congress’s Commerce
Clause power” (quoting United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 245 (3d Cir.
2006))); United States v. Mitra, 405 F.3d 492, 493, 496 (7th Cir. 2005) (affirming a
conviction under § 1030 for damaging an emergency response communications
system of Madison, Wisconsin, and rejecting the argument that the intrastate nature
of the attack placed the defendant’s actions outside the CFAA’s jurisdiction on the
grounds that Congress can regulate conduct affecting a computer once the
computer itself is used in interstate commerce).
69. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B) (“[T]he term ‘protected computer’ means a
computer . . . which is used in interstate or foreign commerce or communication,
including a computer located outside the United States that is used in a manner that affects
interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United States.” (emphasis
added)).
70. Kerr, supra note 40, at 1571; see also United States v. Ivanov, 175 F. Supp. 2d
367, 373–75 (D. Conn. 2001) (acknowledging Congress’s power to apply its statutes
extraterritorially and finding the plain language of § 1030(e)(2)(B) to clearly extend
the CFAA to foreign computers).

HERNACKI.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

1554

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

6/14/2012 7:08 PM

[Vol. 61:1543

71

calculators. Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit decided to explicitly and unequivocally include even
basic cell phones—those that only make calls and send text messages
without Internet or app functionality—within the definition of
72
“computer.”
This broad definition, both in the statute and in
courts’ interpretations, means that unauthorized access of nearly
every computational device, including smartphones, would fall under
the CFAA.
B. Three Approaches to Interpreting Definitional Ambiguities and Omissions
of the CFAA
The CFAA does not define several key terms. Most notably, the
73
statute fails to define “access” and “authorization,” absences that
74
have drawn academic criticism and led to judicial uncertainty.
Further, the CFAA provides only a vague and arguably circular
definition for “exceeds authorized access,” namely that it “means to
access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain
or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not so
75
entitled to obtain or alter.” Accordingly, courts and academics have
struggled to interpret these undefined and vague provisions and have
76
looked to other areas of the law for guidance. Over the past decade,
71. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1) (defining “computer” as “an electronic, magnetic,
optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device performing
logical, arithmetic, or storage functions . . . includ[ing] any data storage facility or
communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with such
device, but . . . not includ[ing] an automated typewriter or typesetter, a portable
hand held calculator, or other similar device”); see Kerr, supra note 40, at 1571 (citing
Mitra, 405 F.3d at 496) (commenting that “[e]verything else with a microchip or that
permits digital storage is, arguably, covered”).
72. See United States v. Kramer, 631 F.3d 900, 902–03 (8th Cir.) (affirming a
sentence enhancement for using a basic cell phone in the commission of
transporting a minor in interstate commerce with the intent to engage in criminal
sexual activity), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2977 (2011).
73. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6).
74. See LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1132–33 (9th Cir. 2009)
(employing a variety of statutory construction techniques—including dictionary
definitions and the rule of lenity—to reject an interpretation of unauthorized access
grounded in agency-law principles); United States v. Phillips, 477 F.3d 215, 219 (5th
Cir. 2007) (acknowledging the CFAA’s failure to define authorization and
interpreting it according to the nebulous idea of “expected norms of intended use or
the nature of the relationship established between the computer owner and the
user”); see also Kerr, supra note 23, at 1619–24 (differentiating between “virtual” and
“physical” notions of access and authorization).
75. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6).
76. See, e.g., Peter A. Winn, The Guilty Eye: Unauthorized Access, Trespass, and
Privacy, 62 BUS. LAW. 1395, 1398–99 (2007) (proposing a view of unauthorized access
statutes grounded in classical trespass law); see also Lawrence Lessig, The Death of
Cyberspace, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 337, 344 (2000) (opposing a property-rights
oriented approach in favor of a more restrictive view of unauthorized access to avoid
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three distinct approaches have emerged for how to interpret and
apply what it means to access a computer without, or in excess of,
authorization: (1) the contract-based approach; (2) the agency-based
approach; and (3) the code-based approach.
1.

The contract-based approach
Under the contract-based approach, one “exceeds authorized
access,” in violation of the CFAA, when accessing a computer in such
77
a way that violates an existing “contract.” In this context, “contract”
includes not only traditional contracts, such as employment
78
79
contracts or network service provider agreements, but also more
informal agreements, including employer computer-use policies or
80
other company handbooks.
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in United
81
States v. Czubinski developed the contract-based approach, though
only in dicta. In Czubinski, an Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
employee signed a contract containing a policy of limiting access to
82
IRS files for only “official purposes.” The court assumed, in dicta
and without any additional explanation, that Czubinski’s perusal of
files on the IRS database for personal reasons “unquestionably
83
exceeded authorized access to a Federal interest computer.” While
economic waste).
77. Patricia L. Bellia, Defending Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2164, 2212 (2004)
(explaining that a computer owner may control access by providing notice of terms
of use); Nicholas R. Johnson, Note, “I Agree” to Criminal Liability: Lori Drew’s
Prosecution Under § 1030(A)(2)(C) of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and Why Every
Internet User Should Care, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 561, 570 (explaining that a
computer owner may control access by a contract and that protections against
unauthorized access derive from traditional contract law principles).
78. See, e.g., EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 582–84 (1st
Cir. 2001) (holding that breach of an employment-related confidentiality agreement
exceeded authorized access, but not deciding whether the access itself was
unauthorized).
79. See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 252–53
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that Verio’s use of “search robots” on Register.com’s
“WHOIS” domain-name registration database breached Register.com’s policy
forbidding the use of “WHOIS” data for marketing purposes and thereby violated §
1030(a)(2)(C) and (a)(5)(a)), aff’d, 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004); Am. Online, Inc. v.
LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 450 (E.D. Va. 1998) (finding that LCGM violated §
1030(a)(2)(C) when it used “extractor software” to harvest e-mail addresses from
AOL for the purpose of sending bulk-spam advertisements in violation of AOL’s TOS
agreement).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1260–65 (11th Cir. 2010)
(affirming the conviction under the CFAA of a SSA teleservices agent who violated
the SSA’s computer-use policy when he accessed the SSA database to obtain personal
information of women in whom he was romantically interested), cert. denied, 131 S.
Ct. 2166 (2011).
81. 106 F.3d 1069 (1st Cir. 1997).
82. Id. at 1071.
83. Id. at 1078.
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the First Circuit continued to apply the contract-based approach in
84
the employment law context, other courts and academics have also
discussed the contract-based approach in website or network service
85
provider terms-of-service (TOS) “clickwrap” agreements. Under this
application, “a website owner or service provider can establish
86
criminal liability through . . . [rarely read] terms of service,”
granting broad discretion to the owner or service provider to choose
87
what might constitute a criminal violation of the CFAA.
88
The recent and tragic case United States v. Drew involved an
attempted application of the contract-based approach to website TOS
89
agreements.
In Drew, Lori Drew was charged with violating §
1030(a)(2)(C) for creating a fake profile on MySpace.com to contact
90
and befriend thirteen-year-old Megan Meier. After several weeks of
communicating with Meier through the fake profile of “Josh Evans,”
Drew, posing as “Evans,” sent a message to Meier indicating that
“Evans” no longer liked her and that “the world would be a better
91
92
place without her in it.” That same day, Meier committed suicide.
Drew was then charged with violating § 1030(a)(2)(C) for
unauthorized access because she had violated the Myspace TOS
93
“contract” by creating the fake profile. The trial judge, Judge Wu,
however, did not accept this novel approach and granted Drew’s
94
In holding that violations of website TOS
motion for acquittal.
95
agreements would encourage discriminatory enforcement, Judge
Wu stated that such an approach would “transform[] section
1030(a)(2)(C) into an overwhelmingly overbroad enactment that
would convert a multitude of otherwise innocent Internet users into
96
misdemeanant criminals.”
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
84. See EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 582–84 (1st Cir.
2001) (holding that violation of a confidentiality agreement can constitute exceeding
unauthorized access).
85. Cyrus Y. Chung, Note, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: How Computer Science
Can Help with the Problem of Overbreadth, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 233, 241 n.62 (2010)
(defining a “clickwrap contract” as “one in which a computer user indicates assent
with a mouse click rather than a signature”).
86. Id. at 241.
87. Id. at 242.
88. 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
89. Id. at 457.
90. Id. at 452.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 452–53.
94. Id. at 467.
95. Id. at 463–65.
96. Id. at 466.
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Circuit adopted another variation of the contract-based approach in
97
In Rodriguez, a Social Security
United States v. Rodriguez.
Administration (SSA) teleservices agent allegedly used his access to
the SSA database to obtain information about women in whom he
98
was romantically interested. Rodriguez, however, refused to sign an
agreement acknowledging the SSA’s policy prohibiting access to SSA
database information for a purpose other than a “business reason,”
though the SSA reinforced its policy through mandatory training
99
sessions, office notices, and a daily alert on company computers.
The court held that, even though there was no formal contract in
place, violating a corporate computer-use policy can be sufficient to
constitute “exceed[ing] authorized access” and, therefore,
Rodriguez’s actions amounted to a criminal violation of §
100
1030(a)(2)(B).
After the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Rodriguez, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit clarified its position in United
101
States v. Nosal. In Nosal, a former employee of an executive search
firm allegedly convinced several current employees to access the
firm’s proprietary executive database, in apparent violation of
existing computer-use policies, to further the creation of his own
102
competing firm.
Notably, the district court found that Nosal’s
conspirators had authority to obtain the allegedly proprietary
information for legitimate business purposes and did not exceed
103
authorized access even if they acted with fraudulent intent.
In reversing the district court’s decision, a panel of the Ninth
Circuit held that “as long as the employee has knowledge of the
employer’s limitations on that authorization, the employee ‘exceeds
104
authorized access’ when the employee violates those limitations.”
However, the entire Ninth Circuit sitting en banc changed course
and affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that “‘exceeds
authorized access’ in the CFAA does not extend to violations of use
105
restrictions.”
The court’s holding has created a definitive circuit

97. 628 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2166 (2011).
98. Id. at 1260–61.
99. Id. at 1260.
100. Id. at 1263.
101. 642 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d en banc, No. 10-10038, 2012 WL 1176119
(9th Cir. Apr. 10, 2012).
102. Id. at 783.
103. Id. at 785 (discussing United States v. Nosal, No. C 08-0237-MHP, 2010 WL
934257, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2010)).
104. Id. at 788. The court added “it is as simple as that.” Id.
105. United States v. Nosal, No. 10-10038, 2012 WL 1176119, at *7 (9th Cir. Apr.
10, 2012) (en banc).
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split with the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh circuits, raising the
distinct possibility of review by the Supreme Court. In adopting a
narrow interpretation of “exceeds authorized access,” the court
joined the ranks of numerous federal district courts and academics
107
that have routinely criticized the contract-based approach, citing
108
109
the rule of lenity as well as overbreadth and vagueness concerns.
2.

The agency-based approach
The agency-based approach employs common law agency tenets to
argue that an agent acts “without authorization” when he breaches a
110
state law duty of loyalty or fiduciary duty to the principal. The most
common application of this approach occurs between employers and
111
employees. The agency-based approach was introduced in Shurgard
112
Storage Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc. In this case, plaintiff
Shurgard alleged defendant Safeguard hired away Shurgard
employees who had access to confidential business plans and other
113
trade secrets.
Shurgard argued the former employees were no
longer its agents when they sent e-mails to their new employer
“containing various trade secrets and proprietary information”

106. See id. at *6 (refusing to adopt an interpretation of “exceeds authorized
access” grounded in “culpable behavior” and commenting that other federal circuit
courts have “failed to consider the effect on millions of ordinary citizens caused by
the statue’s unitary definition”); see also id. at *10 (Silverman, J., dissenting)
(discussing how the en banc majority’s decision is also at odds with the Eighth
Circuit’s implicit adoption of the contract-based approach in United States v.
Teague, 646 F.3d 1119, 1121–22 (8th Cir. 2011)).
107. See id. at *7 (majority opinion) (collecting cases holding that the CFAA does
not prohibit unauthorized disclosure, misuse, or misappropriation of information).
108. Id. (reasoning that the rule of lenity necessitates a narrow interpretation of
“exceeds unauthorized access” in order to ensure that both citizens and Congress will
have fair notice of criminal conduct under the law as to avoid “unintentionally
turn[ing] ordinary citizens into criminals”).
109. See id. at *6 (reasoning that criminalizing inherently transitory, and generally
vague, terms of service agreements invites arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement); see also Chung, supra note 85, at 242–43 (noting that courts have
found the contract-based approach to be contrary to the plain language of the CFAA,
established public policy, copyright law, First Amendment law, state employment
regulation, and trade secret law).
110. Katherine Messenbring Field, Note, Agency, Code, or Contract: Determining
Employees’ Authorization Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 107 MICH. L. REV. 819,
823 (2009) (discussing the evolution of the agency-based theory as a direct
application of agency law to interpret authorization).
111. See, e.g., ReMedPar, Inc. v. AllParts Med., LLC, 683 F. Supp. 2d 605, 610–13
(M.D. Tenn. 2010) (discussing how several federal courts of appeals and numerous
federal district courts have addressed allegations that an employee exceeds
authorized access when he obtains information for a use that is adverse to the
employer’s interests).
112. 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
113. Id. at 1123.
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114

The court, relying
without Shurgard’s knowledge or permission.
primarily on the Restatement (Second) of Agency, held that authorization
ceases when accessers, here, the former Shurgard employees, sever
the agency relationship by breaching a duty of loyalty to the
115
employer/principal.
Accordingly, the court concluded that the
former employees acted without authorization in violation of §
116
1030(a)(2)(C).
In 2006, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
adopted the agency-based approach in International Airport Centers,
117
L.L.C. v. Citrin. In Citrin, former employee Citrin allegedly violated
his employment contract when he quit his job to establish a rival
118
business.
After deciding to resign, Citrin utilized a secure-erasure
program on a work-issued laptop to delete all of the real-estate
acquisition targeting data that he had collected for his former
119
employer as well as evidence of Citrin’s misconduct.
In adopting
the agency-based approach, the court held that Citrin breached his
duty of loyalty to his employer when he quit to establish a competing
business, thereby severing the agency relationship and revoking his
120
authorization to access the laptop.
The Ninth Circuit, however, explicitly rejected the agency-based
121
approach in LVRC Holdings, LLC v. Brekka.
In Brekka, a former
LVRC employee, while still employed at LVRC, allegedly e-mailed
documents from his work computer to himself and to his wife to
122
establish a competing business. The court rejected LVRC’s agencybased argument that authorization terminates the moment that an
employee’s interests becomes adverse to his employer, and expressly
rejected Citrin in holding that Brekka neither acted without
123
authorization nor exceeded his authorized access.
Instead, the
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1125; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 112 (1958) (stating that
agency terminates if an agent, without knowledge of the principal, acquires an
adverse interest or commits a serious breach of loyalty to the principal).
116. Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d. at 1125. Notably, the court also
rejected defendant’s arguments that: (1) information protected under the CFAA was
limited to that which could affect the public; (2) § 1030(a)(5)(C), which proscribes
anyone from “intentionally access[ing] a protected computer without authorization,”
and, as a result of such conduct, causes damage, applies only to “outsiders” and not
to employees; and (3) appropriation of information is insufficient to constitute
“damage.” Id. at 1125–27.
117. 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006).
118. Id. at 419.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 420–21.
121. 581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009).
122. Id. at 1129–30.
123. Id. at 1133–35. The court also employed the rule of lenity to reject reading
any state law duty of loyalty into the definition of “authorization,” noting that a
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court held that “a person uses a computer ‘without authorization’
under §§ 1030(a)(2) and (4) when that person has not received
permission to use the computer for any purpose [such as a hacker],
or when the employer has rescinded permission . . . and the
124
defendant uses the computer anyway.” Given this apparent circuit
125
split on the viability of the agency-based approach, courts and
academics have looked to other areas of the law in attempting to
126
interpret the scope of “authorization.”
3.

The code-based approach
In expressing some concerns over the agency and contract
theories, Professor Orin Kerr articulated a third approach to
127
interpreting the scope of authorization: the code-based approach.
Under this view of technical computer-based protections, access to a
protected computer is unauthorized when a person circumvents
some form of computer code built into the network or system, such
128
as a username/password or a firewall.
Early intimations of this approach can be seen in the infamous
129
university-hacking case, United States v. Morris.
In Morris, a Cornell
130
graduate student wrote and transmitted malicious code that spread
“defendant would have no reason to know that making personal use of [a] company
computer in breach of a state law fiduciary duty to an employer would constitute a
criminal violation of the CFAA.” Id. at 1135.
124. Id. The court also explained that “nothing in the CFAA suggests that a
defendant’s authorization to obtain information stored in a company computer is
‘exceeded’ if the defendant breaches a state law duty of loyalty to an employer, and
we decline to read such a meaning into the statute.” Id. at 1135 n.7.
125. See ReMedPar, Inc. v. AllParts Med., LLC, 683 F. Supp. 2d 605, 610–13 (M.D.
Tenn. 2010) (analyzing the case law stemming from Citrin and Brekka and ultimately
rejecting the agency-based approach as incompatible with the CFAA’s plain language
in light of the rule of lenity). Compare Citrin, 440 F.3d at 421 (adopting the agencybased approach where authorization ends when an agent “‘voids the agency
relationship’” by “‘[v]iolating the duty of loyalty, or failing to disclose adverse
interests’” to those of the principal (quoting State v. DiGiulio, 835 P.2d 488, 492
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1992))), with Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1134 (refusing to adopt the agency
theory and sever authorization when the defendant’s “mental state changed from
loyal employee to disloyal competitor”).
126. See, e.g., Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Speed, No. 6:05-cv-1580-ORL-31, 2006 WL
2683058, at *6–7 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2006) (explicitly rejecting the agency-based
approach in favor of a “plain meaning” interpretation of authorized access); Field,
supra note 110, at 821 nn.6–7 (listing various district court cases employing contract
or code-based interpretations rather than the agency theory).
127. Kerr, supra note 23, at 1649.
128. Id. at 1644–45 (discussing code-based circumventions as involving a user
either: (1) “masquerad[ing] as another user who has greater [access] privileges”; or
(2) “exploit[ing] a weakness in the code within a program to cause the program to
malfunction in a way that grants the user greater privileges”).
129. 928 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1991).
130. While Morris wrote the malicious code on a computer at the Cornell lab to
which he had been given authorization, he ultimately transmitted it from a computer
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uncontrollably to ultimately infect and crash university, medical
131
The court
research, and military servers around the country.
rejected Morris’ argument that liability for accessing a computer
“without authorization” was limited to the computer that Morris
132
actually used to inject the malicious code. Rather, the court looked
to the “intended function” of the university computer in holding that
Morris’ program allowed him to “access” (through the malicious
code) federal interest computers to which he did not have
133
authorization to use.
Professor Kerr expanded upon this idea of
the “intended function” test in developing his code-based approach,
explaining that “a user who exploits a weakness in code to trick the
victim computer into granting the user extra privileges does so by
134
using the code in a way contrary to its intended function.”
To date, no court has explicitly adopted the code-based approach,
but the view is often conflated with a similar theory, described as the
plain-meaning theory, because the scope of authorization often rests
135
on a computer-based safeguard, such as a password.
Nonetheless,
this approach remains one of the leading academic approaches to
addressing the statutorily-undefined and ambiguous provisions of the
136
CFAA.
C. The Vagueness Doctrine and the CFAA
The vagueness doctrine embodies the idea that due process
requires Congress to enact statutes such that: (1) the public can
understand what conduct is prohibited; and (2) the courts have
137
meaningful standards to enforce.
In effect, the doctrine places a
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in order to disguise the code’s origin.
Id. at 506.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 510.
133. Id.
134. Kerr, supra note 23, at 1645.
135. See Black & Decker (US), Inc. v. Smith, 568 F. Supp. 2d 929, 934–35 (W.D.
Tenn. 2008) (asserting that “the plain meaning of ‘exceeds authorized access’ is ‘to
go beyond the access permitted’” and the “plain meaning [of without authorization]
is ‘no access authorization’”); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. L-3 Comm. Corp., No. 6:05cv-1580-Orl-31KRS, 2007 WL 569994, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 20, 2007) (declining to
adopt an expanded view of authorized access beyond the plain language); Lockheed
Martin Corp. v. Speed, No. 6:05-CV-1580-ORL-31, 2006 WL 2683058, at *6 (M.D. Fla.
Aug. 1, 2006) (noting that “the plain meaning [of exceeds authorized access] brings
clarity to the picture and illuminates the straightforward intention of Congress”).
136. Chung, supra note 85, at 244 n.83 (citing Bellia, supra note 77, at 2258; Sara
M. Smyth, Back to the Future: Crime and Punishment in Second Life, 36 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 18, 41 (2009)). But see Winn, supra note 76, at 1419
(criticizing the code-based approach as “flatly inconsistent” with the CFAA’s
separation of “unauthorized access” and “access in excess of authorization”).
137. See Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 403–04 (1966) (reversing a
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138

due-process backstop behind Congress to allow courts to reign in
broad and ambiguous statutes by substituting narrower readings of
139
vague provisions.
The doctrine was introduced by Justice Sutherland in Connally v.
140
General Construction Co.
In Connally, the Court invalidated an
Oklahoma statute criminalizing the failure of state contractors to pay
141
In
employees fair wages in line with those paid in the locality.
doing so, the Court ordered that the terms of a criminal statute must
explicitly state the prohibited conduct and its penalties in clear,
142
unambiguous language, or risk violating due process of law.
Further, the doctrine has been interpreted to provide grounds for
invalidating a statute not only when the statute does not provide “fair
notice” to the public, but also when it inures law enforcement to
143
engage in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law.
144
While the vagueness doctrine is often considered a “powerful tool”
145
vague laws
in First Amendment freedom-of-speech litigation,
unrelated to speech regulation violate due process when a reasonable
146
person cannot tell what conduct is prohibited.
Notably, the due
process rights implicated through application of the vagueness
doctrine are not limited to individuals, as due process also extends to
147
corporate entities.
conviction for misdemeanor gun charges on due process vagueness grounds because
the Pennsylvania statute lacked legally-fixed standards for both juries and judges).
138. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (explaining the
constitutional roots of the vagueness doctrine).
139. Compare City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 57, 64 (1999) (invalidating a
Chicago anti-loitering ordinance for failing to provide fair notice, thus rendering the
statute unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Due Process Clause), with id. at
112 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the ordinance should be upheld under a
narrow reading of the ambiguous statutory language).
140. 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
141. Id. at 395.
142. Id. at 391.
143. See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008) (explaining that a
statute is found to violate due process if it is so vague it enables “seriously
discriminatory enforcement”); Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 (“Where the legislature fails
to provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit ‘a standardless
sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal
predilections.’” (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974))).
144. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 943 (4th
ed. 2011).
145. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 370 (White, J., dissenting) (describing how precise
drafting is required for First Amendment cases because the vagueness doctrine
demands a “greater degree of specificity” when concerning expression).
146. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 144, at 941–43; see also United States v. Mazurie, 419
U.S. 544, 550 (1975) (“It is well established that vagueness challenges to statutes
which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in light of the
facts of the case at hand.”).
147. See Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936) (holding that a state
law deprived a newspaper corporation of the liberty guaranteed under the
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In the context of the CFAA, application of the vagueness doctrine
revolves largely around the nebulous concepts of “authorization” and
“access.” There are certainly clear examples of unauthorized access
148
to a protected computer that do not raise vagueness concerns.
Such instances include the injection of malicious code or the use of
other hacking techniques to bypass a firewall, or infecting a website
with malicious code to collect network passwords so the wrongdoer
149
can sell them or otherwise disclose their contents.
These types of
cases appear to be clear-cut examples of hacking that should
implicate liability for unauthorized access. However, a significant
150
gray area exists primarily in instances of “insider” access. Courts are
therefore tasked with striking a balance that both prevents overpunishment and deters unauthorized access, while staying within the
boundaries of due process.
II. BROAD INTERPRETATIONS OF UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS MAY RENDER
THE CFAA UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE
The broadest and most troublesome provision of the CFAA is §
1030(a)(2)(C), which creates criminal liability for whoever
“intentionally . . . exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains . . .
151
information from any protected computer.”
Many users easily
satisfy the “obtains information” prong by simply observing
Fourteenth Amendment); Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 111 (1928)
(explaining that it is well settled that “a corporation is a ‘person’ within the meaning
of the due process clause” and accordingly may not be deprived of property without
due process of law).
148. See, e.g., United States v. Willis, 476 F.3d 1121, 1125–26 (10th Cir. 2007)
(affirming a conviction under § 1030(a)(2)(C) when a collection agency employee
gave access to customer accounts to his drug dealer in exchange for
methamphetamine).
149. See, e.g., United States v. Ivanov, 175 F. Supp. 2d 367, 368–69 (D. Conn. 2001)
(denying motion to dismiss under a plain-meaning approach when the defendant
hacked into a “financial transaction clearinghouse,” obtained network passwords,
and then blackmailed the company).
150. “Insider” access is closely linked to the idea of “exceeds authorized access,”
namely that one who has initial authorization and then later exceeds it is said to have
done so from the “inside.” By comparison, the idea of an “outsider” is associated
with the idea of acting “without authorization” and embodies the typical conception
of a hacker. See, e.g., United States v. Nosal, No. 10-10038, 2012 WL 1176119, at *3
(9th Cir. Apr. 10, 2012) (en banc) (“‘[W]ithout authorization’ would apply to outside
hackers (individuals who have no authorized access to the computer at all) and
‘exceeds authorized access’ would apply to inside hackers (individuals whose initial
access to a computer is authorized but who access unauthorized information or
files).”); S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 6 (1996) (“The amendment specifically covers the
conduct of an [outsider] who deliberately breaks into a computer without authority,
or an insider who exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains classified
information and then communicates the information to another person, or retains it
without delivering it to the proper authorities.”).
151. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (2006).
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information, including routine actions such as checking e-mail or
152
In addition, almost anything with a microchip
visiting a website.
153
qualifies as a “protected computer.” Accordingly, criminal liability
turns on the first prong: what does it mean to exceed authorized
154
access?
The answer to this question is critical, yet the statute does
155
Broad interpretations,
not provide any meaningful guidance.
including those that would find liability for violations of written
156
157
access agreements
or breaches of agency law duties,
raise
significant problems of overbreadth and vagueness necessitating a
more narrowly-tailored approach.
While the current approaches to interpreting unauthorized access
under the CFAA may offer viable options for some factual scenarios,
mobile app data privacy cases present new concerns not adequately
addressed by these theories. The contract-based approach, most
frequently applied in employment contract cases, does not translate
to the world of mobile apps where there typically are no privacy158
policy agreements between an app developer and an app user.
Even if an app includes a privacy policy, the app developer writes the
159
This
terms and therefore can dictate the ambit of authorization.
152. See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text (describing the broad scope of
the statute); see also United States v. Tolliver, No. 08-26, 2009 WL 2342639, at *5
(E.D. Pa. 2009) (citing S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 2484 (1986)) (stating that “obtaining
information” under the statute requires merely observing, not actually removing, the
information), aff’d, 451 F. App’x 97 (3d Cir. 2011).
153. See supra Part I.A.3 (discussing the scope of “protected computer” as
concurrent with the breadth of commerce clause jurisdiction).
154. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (defining “authorized access” and laying out the
criminal elements of computer fraud); United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258,
1263 (11th Cir. 2010) (interpreting § 1030 and what constitutes “authorized access”),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2166 (2011).
155. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) (providing an arguably-circular definition of
“exceeds authorized access”—“to access a computer with authorization and to use
such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not
entitled to so obtain or alter”—but failing to define the scope of entitlement).
156. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1263 (employing the contract-based approach
to criminally punish a SSA employee for violating the administration’s computer
terms of use agreement); United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 467 (C.D. Cal. 2009)
(ultimately rejecting the contract-based approach when applied to website terms of
service agreements).
157. See, e.g., LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1134–35 (9th Cir.
2009) (criticizing and rejecting the agency-based approach); Int’l Airport Ctrs.,
L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420–21 (7th Cir. 2006) (adopting the agency-based
approach).
158. See Thurm & Kane, supra note 10 (finding that forty-five out of the 101 most
popular apps do not have privacy policies); Mark Hachman, Most Mobile Apps Lack
Privacy Policies:
Study, PCMAG.COM (Apr. 27, 2011, 7:30 AM),
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2384363,00.asp (describing a recent study
concluding that only nineteen percent of the top 340 free apps utilize privacy
policies).
159. See United States v. Nosal, No. 10-10038, 2012 WL 1176119, at *4 (9th Cir.
Apr. 10, 2012) (en banc) (detailing how a broad, contract-based interpretation of
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discretion essentially allows the developer to manipulate the policy
“so as to turn [the user-developer relationship] into one policed by
160
Problems of fair notice and arbitrary or
the criminal law.”
discriminatory enforcement consequently arise when criminal
liability “turn[s] on the vagaries of private policies that are lengthy,
161
opaque, subject to change and seldom read.” Similarly, application
of the agency-based approach presents fair notice problems. As the
agency-based approach interprets unauthorized access as a breach of
a duty of loyalty, app developers would engage in unauthorized access
any time a user felt that the app infringed on his subjective
162
interests.
Accordingly, under either the contract- or agency-based
theory, app developers do not have fair notice of what conduct is
either without authorization or exceeding authorized access, and the
CFAA therefore runs afoul of the vagueness doctrine.
A. The Contract-Based Approach Raises Fair Notice Concerns for Mobile
Apps
To apply the contract-based approach to mobile apps, the first task
163
is to identify which documents or agreements constitute contracts.
The most obvious examples are app privacy policies. Applying the
contract-based theory, an app developer who violates the terms of a
privacy policy and obtains information from a user’s phone would
164
have accessed information in excess of his authorization.
“exceeds authorized access” would criminalize innocuous Internet browsing if such
activities technically violated an employer’s terms of use agreement); see also Letter
from Laura W. Murphy, Director, ACLU Washington Legislative Office et al., to U.S.
Sens. Leahy & Grassley (Aug. 3, 2011), available at http://cdt.org/files/pdfs/CFAA_
Sign-on_ltr.pdf (describing, as a “gross misuse of the law,” the adherence to a strict
contract-based interpretation to allow private corporations to establish what conduct
violates federal criminal law).
160. See Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 465 (articulating that vagueness problems will result if
a website owner can set the scope of criminal conduct through a terms of service
agreement).
161. See Nosal, 2012 WL 1176119, at *4 (explaining that while many computer-use
policies limit employee use to only “business purposes,” such a restriction is
inherently vague and also virtually meaningless in light of the fact that employers
rarely discipline the occasional use of work computers for personal purposes).
162. See Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp.
2d 1121, 1125 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (finding a former employee liable for access
“without authorization” under § 1030(a)(2)(C) when he acquired interests adverse
to those of his employer).
163. See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text (describing various types of
documents that can be considered contracts, including both formal and informal
agreements).
164. See United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding
that violating the Social Security Administration computer-use policy, considered by
the court to be a contract, constituted “exceeding authorized access”); United States
v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 272 (5th Cir. 2010) (noting that corporate policies can define
“the purposes for which access is ‘authorized’” such that a violation of the corporate
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Accordingly, the app developer would have violated §
1030(a)(2)(C)’s prohibition on merely obtaining information from a
165
protected computer in excess of authorization. The problem with
this approach, however, is that app developers, not end-users, write
the privacy policies. Therefore, the policy is open to manipulation
that would protect developers while still leaving end-users vulnerable
to broad privacy policies with no consequences for infringing
developers.
It may be easiest to see the problem by looking at the typical cases
in which courts employ the contract-based approach: employment
disputes. In the typical employment case, an employee violates the
terms of an employment contract by accessing files on his employer’s
network to which the employee either: (1) has not been given
166
express permission, known as access without authorization; or (2)
uses information to which he had initial access in a manner
inconsistent with the scope of his employment, known as exceeding
167
authorized access. Analogizing to the world of mobile applications,
it is the end-user that should be viewed as the “employer” and the app
developer as the “employee,” since it is the app developer who is
168
acting without or in excess of his authorized access.
Given this
strange juxtaposition, an app developer has the power to dictate the
169
Accordingly,
terms by which he may access the user’s data.
policy is an impermissible access in excess of authorization); United States v.
Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1078 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that violation of employment
contract limiting computer use to “official purposes” constituted “exceeding
authorized access”).
165. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (2006).
166. See LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 2009)
(differentiating “without authorization” as “access[ing] a computer [or portion
thereof] without any permission at all,” from “exceeds authorized access” as a person
who “has permission to access the computer, but accesses information on the
computer that the person is not entitled to access”); see also United States v. Phillips,
477 F.3d 215, 220–21 (5th Cir. 2007) (upholding, on “without authorization”
grounds, the conviction of a student who used his privileges on a university computer
to access part of the system to which he did not have a password).
167. See EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 581–82 (1st Cir.
2001) (concluding that a former employee exceeded authorized access by violating a
broad confidentiality agreement when he created a high-speed “scraper” program to
mine a former employer’s public website for pricing information).
168. See Complaint ¶ 45, Hines v. OpenFeint, Inc., No. CV-11-3084 (N.D. Cal. June
22, 2011), 2011 WL 2471471 (alleging breach of contract when mobile-gaming
network company accessed, without authorization, users’ personal information for
marketing analytics and targeted advertising profiles); Complaint at 3–4, 68–70, Lalo
v. Apple, Inc., No. 10-cv-05878 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2010), 2010 WL 5393496 (alleging
that app developers and mobile advertisers acted without authorization or exceeded
authorized access when their apps acquired personal information such as gender,
age, race, geographic location, and household income without express permission
from the user).
169. See United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 465 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (“[T]erms of
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developers have little incentive to even include a privacy policy, let
alone draft one to include anything less than the broadest possible
170
authority to access a user’s information. Essentially, this approach
puts app developers in a position to manipulate privacy policies by
simultaneously altering the user-developer relationship into one
governed by criminal law while drafting broad enough policies to
171
insulate the developer from any liability.
This, in turn, implicates
the vagueness doctrine by failing to provide adequate notice of what
specific conduct constitutes a violation of law while concurrently
inviting arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
172
The recent case Drew illustrates this point.
While the court in
Drew refused to find a violation of a website TOS agreement
tantamount to a § 1030(a)(2)(C) violation, the court did not
173
pronounce that TOS agreements may never govern authorization.
Rather, the court reasoned that creating a situation where some TOS
agreements (or merely some provisions), but not others, dictate the
scope of authorized access creates an inherently unclear situation
where users do not have fair notice as to what conduct implicates
174
criminal liability. This approach also fails the second prong of the
vagueness doctrine because the statue would lack minimum
175
guidelines to preclude arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
service may allow the website owner to unilaterally amend and/or add to the terms
with minimal notice to users.”).
170. See id. (“[W]ebsite owners can establish terms where either the scope or the
application of the provision are to be decided by them ad hoc and/or pursuant to
undelineated standards.”).
171. Those in favor of a contract-based approach to determine the scope of
authorized access have also turned to the tort of trespass for support. See Brief for
Oracle Am. Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellants, United States v.
Nosal, 642 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-10038), available at
http://volokh.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Oracle-America-Amicus.pdf
(citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts to argue that the tort of trespass can govern
written restrictions on access because any conclusions are derived from factuallydriven, common-sense, totality of the circumstances analyses). This trespass-oriented
approach, however, fails to support the use of written access restrictions in the CFAA
context because the CFAA is a criminal statute subject to vagueness concerns whereas
the standard for the common law trespass tort is inherently unclear. See Orin Kerr,
The Trespass Tort Versus the CFAA: A Response to the Oracle Amicus Brief in Nosal,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 5, 2011, 6:30 PM), http://volokh.com/2011/12/05/thetrespass-tort-versus-the-cfaa-a-response-to-the-oracle-amicus-brief-in-nosal/ (discussing
the conceptual differences between physical trespass and computer-based trespass to
discount the trespass-tort approach as unpersuasive and improperly applied to the
CFAA).
172. 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009); supra notes 88–96 and accompanying text
(discussing the Drew decision).
173. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 466.
174. See id. at 464 (explaining that a contract-based interpretation of the CFAA
fails to provide fair notice because “it is unclear whether any or all violations of terms
of service will render the access unauthorized, or whether only certain ones will”).
175. See id. at 467 (concluding that a contract-based approach would result in §
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Permitting website owners to dictate the line for criminality in the
form of easily-amendable TOS agreements, which few people actually
176
read, creates a similarly non-definite situation encouraging arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement in contravention of the vagueness
177
doctrine.
The website TOS approach is directly analogous to mobile app
privacy policies. By placing the power in the hands of app developers
not only to dictate initial access rights, but to freely amend the terms
to comport with the developer’s whims with minimal, if any, notice to
users, the CFAA’s prohibitions on access without authorization would
not have sufficient clarity to provide fair notice as to what conduct
actually violates the statute.
B. The Agency-Based Approach Raises Arbitrary Enforcement Concerns for
Mobile Apps
The agency-based approach focuses on the idea that an agent
violates the CFAA’s unauthorized access prohibitions by breaching a
178
fiduciary duty of loyalty to the principal. Further, the agent is said
to breach that duty of loyalty by engaging in conduct inconsistent
179
On its face, it is difficult to
with the interests of the principal.
extrapolate the agency-based approach to mobile apps, since there is
no obvious principal-agent relationship between an app developer
180
and an end-user akin to a typical employer-employee relationship.
1030(a)(2)(C) “becom[ing] a law ‘that affords too much discretion to the police and
too little notice to citizens who wish to use the [Internet]’” (quoting City of Chicago
v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 64 (1999))).
176. See, e.g., Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading
Privacy Policies, 4 I.S.J.L.P. 543, 555, 565 (2009) (calculating that the average website
privacy policy takes approximately ten minutes to read and estimating that to read
every privacy policy for each website visited would require approximately 201 hours
per person per year and cost each person about $3534 in lost annual productivity);
Privacy Policy Infographic, SELECTOUT.ORG (Jan. 28, 2011), http://selectout.org/blog/
privacy-policy-infographic/ (analyzing the 1000 most-visited websites and calculating
that the average privacy policy is 2462 words long with the longest policy over 11,000
words long).
177. See Kerr, supra note 40, at 1582 & n.163 (describing the infrequency with
which users read terms-of-service contracts, and discussing the absurd results that can
follow from allowing these agreements to govern access rights).
178. See Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420–21 (7th Cir. 2006)
(invoking § 387 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency to conclude that a former
employee violated his duty of loyalty when “he resolved to destroy files . . . that were .
. . the property of his employer”).
179. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 112 (1958); see also WILLIAM A. GREGORY,
THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 103 (3d ed. 2001) (explaining that beginning
work for a competitor is tantamount to obtaining an adverse interest).
180. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Speed, No. 6:05-CV-1580-ORL-31, 2006 WL
2683058, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2006) (“[B]y reading Restatement [(Second) of Agency]
§ 112 legalese into the meaning of ‘without authorization,’ the term becomes
equipped with a breadth that effectively shaves ‘exceeds authorized access’ down to a
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The app developer, however, is the party “obtaining” information
181
purportedly in violation of the interests of the app user, and, as
such, the app developer is in the same position as the
employee/agent for purposes of the principal-agent connection. The
key problem with trying to employ the agency-based approach to
mobile app cases, however, is that there may be millions of users of a
182
single app, each with invariably different “interests.”
Accordingly,
an app’s information-collection plan may comport with the interests
183
of some users but directly conflict with those of others. The agencybased approach would then permit criminal prosecution and civil
liability when the app collects information adverse to the subjective
184
interests of a single user. Such an approach falls short of providing
developers with fair notice of what information their apps may obtain
185
to avoid exceeding authorized access and implicating liability.
The recent case Nosal illustrates the difficulty of applying the
mere sliver of what its plain meaning suggests.”); see also Field, supra note 110, at 843–
44 (discussing the difficulties of applying the “elusive and nebulous” principles of
common-law fiduciary duties to a statutory setting, and noting agency law’s “potential
for manipulability” to obtain outcomes commonly “cloaked in moralistic terms”).
181. See Complaint ¶ 47, Hines v. OpenFeint, Inc., No. CV-11-3084 (N.D. Cal. June
22, 2011), 2011 WL 2471471 (alleging that the use of personal information collected
through a mobile-gaming app for purposes of marketing and targeted advertising
violated user’s privacy interests); Complaint at 68–70, Lalo v. Apple, Inc., No. 10-cv05878 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2010), 2010 WL 5393496 (alleging that the collection of
purportedly personal information through mobile apps violated users’ privacy
interests).
182. See Privacy Please! U.S. Smartphone App Users Concerned with Privacy When it
Comes to Location, NIELSEN.COM (Apr. 21, 2011), http://blog.nielsen.com/
nielsenwire/online_mobile/privacy-please-u-s-smartphone-app-users-concerned-withprivacy-when-it-comes-to-location (finding that mobile app users’ concerns over
privacy vary based on both gender and age demographics). Nielsen’s research
shows, for example, that only a slight majority of men (fifty-two percent) and women
(fifty-nine percent) are concerned about privacy relating to location-based apps. Id.
183. Id.; see Lockheed Martin, 2006 WL 2683058, at *7 (rejecting the agency-based
approach in part because “the ‘adverse interest’ inquiry affixes remarkable reach to
the [CFAA]” such that an employee checking e-mail on company time could
implicate criminal liability).
184. See Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420 (7th Cir. 2006)
(upholding an employee’s liability under the CFAA when he breached a duty of
loyalty to his employer, thereby severing the agency relationship, and therefore
acting without authorization); Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage,
Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1125 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (applying the Restatement to hold
that authorization ceases when an agent acts with an interest adverse to that of the
principal).
185. Despite the potential fair-notice problems and the inconsistencies of
importing agency law principles into the CFAA, some courts continue to rely on the
Citrin approach if there is a “pattern of activity adverse to [an] employer’s interests.”
See Deloitte & Touche L.L.P. v. Carlson, No. 11 C 327, 2011 WL 2923865, at *4–5
(N.D. Ill. July 18, 2011) (denying a motion to dismiss a CFAA claim against a former
employee who destroyed data on a company-issued laptop, and holding that a breach
of a duty of an employee’s duty of loyalty can support a “without authorization” claim
under § 1030(a)(2)).
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agency-based approach without implicating vagueness concerns. In
Nosal, the majority en banc ultimately concluded that an employee
does not exceed authorized access when that access violates an
187
employer’s computer-use restrictions.
Accordingly, the employee
was not liable under the CFAA despite acting contrary to his
188
employer’s interest and breaching a state-law duty of loyalty.
In
reversing the panel decision, which reached a contrary conclusion in
large part because Nosal was charged with violating § 1030(a)(4) and
189
not the broader § 1030(a)(2)(C),
the court reasoned that
principles of statutory construction foreclosed interpretation of
“exceeds authorized access” in different ways for each subsection
190
when Congress provided only one statutory definition.
The en banc court corrected the panel’s failure to recognize that
the panel’s interpretation of “exceeds authorized access” under §
1030(a)(4) would drastically change the scope of the already broader
191
§ 1030(a)(2)(C), which has no intent-to-defraud requirement.
By
contrast, the en banc court reasoned that by utilizing an employer’s
computer-use restrictions to define the boundaries of “exceeding
authorized access” under § 1030(a)(4), anyone who obtains
information from a computer connected to the Internet, in
192
contravention of those restrictions, violates § 1030(a)(2)(C). Such
an interpretation creates a situation not only where criminal liability
rests on employer restrictions that are “not necessarily drafted with
the definiteness or precision that would be required for a criminal
193
statute,” but would also make the CFAA ripe for arbitrary and
186. See supra notes 101–09 and accompanying text (discussing the Nosal
decision).
187. No. 10-10038, 2012 WL 1176119, at *7 (9th Cir. Apr. 10, 2012) (en banc).
188. See id. at *9 (Silverman, J., dissenting) (articulating how the court’s decision
in Brekka foreclosed “exceed[ing] authorized access” liability for duty of loyalty
breaches).
189. Section 1030(a)(4) requires both intent to defraud and violative access that
furthers the intended fraud. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2006). In contrast. §
1030(a)(2)(C) has no such mens rea requirement. Id. § 1030(a)(2)(C).
190. Nosal, 2012 WL 1176119, at *4.
191. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (covering “[w]hoever knowingly and with
intent to defraud [accesses] a protected computer without authorization” (emphasis
added)), with id. § 1030(a)(2) (covering “[w]hoever intentionally accesses a computer
without authorization or exceeds authorized access” (emphasis added)).
192. Nosal, 2012 WL 1176119, at *5; see also United States v. Nosal, 642 F.3d 781,
790 (9th Cir. 2011) (Campbell, J., dissenting) (arguing, on similar vagueness
grounds, against the broader interpretation of “exceeds authorized access” in order
to avoid criminalizing innocuous computer use), rev’d en banc, No. 10-10038, 2012
WL 1176119 (9th Cir. Apr. 10, 2012). But see Nosal, 2012 WL 1176119, at *10
(Silverman, J., dissenting) (arguing that the en banc majority improperly “posit[ed]
a laundry list of wacky hypotheticals” under § 1030(a)(2)(C) instead of focusing
purely on § 1030(a)(4)).
193. Nosal, 642 F.3d at 790 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
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194

and
render
the
statute
discriminatory
enforcement
195
unconstitutionally vague.
These vagueness concerns similarly arise in attempting to apply the
agency theory to mobile app data privacy cases. Reading a duty of
loyalty into the relationship between app developers and users would
mean that anytime an app obtained any information from a user’s
phone, in violation of the interests of the user, the app developer
196
would be guilty of a federal crime under § 1030(a)(2)(C).
While
the panel majority in Nosal tried to counter this line of argument by
imposing a requirement that the employee/agent “ha[ve]
knowledge” of the employer/principal’s limitations in order to
implicate liability, this requirement has no support in either the text
of the CFAA nor the legislative history, “and only becomes necessary
upon adopting the [panel] majority’s interpretation of ‘exceeds
197
authorization.’”
Application of the agency-based approach essentially means that
each time an agent “obtains” information from a protected computer
that does not further the principal’s interest, such as checking
personal e-mail or a personal Facebook account, each instance can
198
amount to a federal crime.
In the context of mobile apps, each
time an app accesses a piece of user information for purposes other
than what the user considers to be within the scope of his interests,
the app developer is obtaining information from a protected
199
computer in violation of § 1030(a)(2)(C). Accordingly, the agency194. Nosal, 2012 WL 1178119, at *6 (rejecting the government’s assurance that it
would not prosecute minor violations and noting that “the difference between
puffery [in the form of lying about age or height on a social media website] and
prosecution may depend on whether you happen to be someone an AUSA has
reason to go after”).
195. Id. at *6–7 (combining a discussion of the vagueness doctrine’s fair notice
and arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement prongs with the court’s related rule of
lenity concerns).
196. See Nosal, 642 F.3d at 788 (“[A]s long as the employee has knowledge of the
employer’s limitation on that authorization, the employee ‘exceeds authorized
access’ when the employee violates those limitations.”).
197. Id. at 790 n.3 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
198. See Kerr, supra note 40, at 1586–87 (“[A] broad agency theory of
authorization would turn millions of employees into criminals [and] give the
government the power to arrest almost anyone who had a computer at work . . . .”);
see also Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Speed, No. 6:05-CV-1580-ORL-31, 2006 WL
2683058, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2006) (cautioning against the agency-based
approach and suggesting that merely checking personal e-mail at work could amount
to CFAA liability).
199. See Nosal, 2012 WL 1176119, at *5 (noting that merely visiting ESPN.com or
playing sudoku from a work computer would be transformed into a federal crime);
Nosal, 642 F.3d at 790 (Campbell, J., dissenting) (explaining that merely “viewing”
information for any purpose adverse to the interest of the computer owner would be
grounds for a federal crime).
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theory approach does not provide fair notice to app developers as to
what kinds of specific information an app may obtain without
implicating liability under the CFAA. Absent such fair notice, the
CFAA fails to comport with due process under the vagueness
200
doctrine.
C. The Code-Based Approach is Under-Inclusive Because it Ignores the
Problem of Insider Misuse of Information
At first blush, the code-based approach seems like a simple and
201
attractive way to define the limits of authorized access to computers.
However, the theory does not adequately address the issue of insider
misuse of information by failing to protect unsophisticated users,
limiting liability to only those acting without authorization, and
failing to provide a remedy for unauthorized access to data stored by
third parties.
Under this view, a person acts without authorization by
202
circumventing computer-code-based restrictions.
Similarly, the
person acts in excess of authorization if she has initial permission to
access a computer but then bypasses a code-based restriction to access
203
other information on a different part of the computer or network.
The code-based approach therefore places the burden of
safeguarding information on the computer owner, instead of
burdening the accesser to rigidly comply with either the express
204
terms of a contract or the vague notion of the owner’s interests. By
punishing the exploitation of vulnerabilities through malicious code
200. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 57, 64 (1999) (expounding the
notion that criminal statutes must provide fair notice in order to comport with due
process and avoid constitutional vagueness).
201. See Kerr, supra note 23, at 1649 (arguing that the code-based approach strikes
a balance between the often-conflicting goals of Internet regulation: Internetfreedom and data-protection).
202. See Garrett D. Urban, Comment, Causing Damage Without Authorization: The
Limitations of Current Judicial Interpretations of Employee Authorization Under the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1369, 1379–80 (2011) (describing access
in excess of authorization as requiring a person with initial access to “fake
identification, ‘exploit a weakness in the code,’ or affirmatively act to misuse the
computer in some way”).
203. Id.; see also Fink v. Time Warner Cable, 810 F. Supp. 2d 633, 638, 643 (S.D.N.Y
2011) (denying a motion to dismiss a complaint against mega-ISP Time Warner for
“throttling” peer-to-peer file-sharing speeds, and employing a “plain meaning,”
dictionary-definition approach to determine the scope of access).
204. See Urban, supra note 202, at 1380 n.66 (citing State v. Riley, 988 A.2d 1252,
1258 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2009)) (acknowledging that courts have not yet
adopted a code-based interpretation for the CFAA, but identifying one such judicial
interpretation in reference to a state computer fraud statute); see also Sw. Airlines Co.
v. BoardFirst, L.L.C., No. 3:06 Civ. 0891-B, 2007 WL 4823761, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Sept.
12, 2007) (utilizing a dictionary-definition approach to define access as “to get at” or
“gain access to” similar to the code-based approach).
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or “tricking” the computer by using someone else’s username and
password, the code-based theory comes closest to addressing the
205
original intent of the CFAA as an anti-hacking provision, and
therefore provides a strong remedy for outsider access that is
inherently “without authorization.”
However, this focus on bypassing security as the sole means of
defining unauthorized access in effect blurs the line between access
“without authorization” and access that “exceeds authorization,” a
206
distinction that both the plain text of the CFAA and legislative
207
Absent this distinction, the CFAA would
history strongly support.
offer no protection to unsophisticated users, such as a homeowner
208
who fails to secure a wireless network or a careless business owner.
More importantly, this approach would fail to implicate liability for
an insider who is given authorization to access a computer, but then
209
later misuses information on the computer.
There would be no
cause of action even if the insider causes significant damage either to
the computer itself—deleting files, inserting malicious code, etc.—or
to its owner, perhaps through disclosure or sale of sensitive
210
information to a third party. Applying the code-based approach to
205. Compare Kerr, supra note 23, at 1644–45 (discussing circumvention of
regulation by code through masquerade or malicious manipulation of computer
weaknesses), with S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 6–7 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2479, 2485 (discussing the need to balance concern for authorized users “against the
legitimate need to protect Government computers against abuse by ‘outsiders’”).
206. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(2), (4)–(5) (2006) (specifically prohibiting either
access without authorization or actions that exceed authorized access). Collapsing
these two phrases into one does not comport with the Supreme Court’s recurrent
position that statutory interpretations should avoid rendering terms superfluous.
Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 442 (2009); Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 106
(1993) (citing Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 109 (1990)); Reiter v. Sonotone
Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979).
207. See S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 4 (1996) (discussing the dichotomy between the
CFAA’s privacy protection coverage for outsider perpetrators who obtain
nonclassified information via unauthorized computer access on one hand and
“[g]overnment employees who abuse their computer access to obtain Government
information that may be sensitive and confidential”); see also Chung, supra note 85, at
246 (citing United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 460 (C.D. Cal. 2009)) (discussing
the distinction between “without authorization” and “exceeds authorization”
language).
208. Winn, supra note 76, at 1421.
209. See Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat’l Health Care Disc., Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1255,
1272–73 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (recognizing that access in the CFAA context cannot be
defined without considering the “freedom or ability to . . . make use of something”
(emphasis added) (quoting MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 6 (10th ed.
1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The court there further explained that
“[f]or purposes of the CFAA, when someone sends an e-mail message from his or her
own computer, and the message then is transmitted through a number of computers
until it reaches its destination, the sender is making use of all of those computers,
and is therefore ‘accessing’ them.” Id. at 1273.
210. See Winn, supra note 76, at 1420 (analogizing to the tort of trespass to chattels
to argue that the code-based approach “leaves data subjects with no legal remedy
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mobile app cases, an app developer would only be subject to liability
under the CFAA if the developer circumvents some kind of safeguard
built into the phone, such as a username/password or other security
measure, but not if the developer seriously misuses any information
obtained through the app or damages the user’s phone.
Critics of the code-based approach have raised similar concerns
over its rigid and under-inclusive nature, noting “code-based theory
limits data owners’ flexibility in the ways they might choose to protect
211
their data.” Moreover, the code-based approach does not appear to
provide an avenue for relief for users’ data stored by a third party,
212
such as in the instance of cloud computing.
In short, the codebased approach’s attempt to simplify unauthorized access fails to
offer a remedy for harm resulting from access in excess of
authorization despite the CFAA’s explicit distinction between insider
and outsider access.
III. COURTS SHOULD LIMIT INTERPRETATIONS OF UNAUTHORIZED
ACCESS TO TRADITIONAL NOTIONS OF HACKING OR SERIOUS MISUSE OF
INFORMATION
As the broader agency- and contract-based views raise significant
vagueness concerns, commentators have stressed the importance of a
213
narrow view in order to not only avoid constitutional issues, but also
to shift the focus of the statute towards its original intent as an anti214
hacking provision.
The code-based approach, which limits
unauthorized access to the circumvention of any computer-code
restrictions, appears superficially to provide a straightforward method
215
for interpreting unauthorized access. However, this view blurs the
against unauthorized intruders into their private data”).
211. Chung, supra note 85, at 247; see also Winn, supra note 76, at 1419 (arguing
that the code-based approach “artificially restricts the set of norms to which courts
are permitted to look, to . . . a system of ‘norms by nerds’”).
212. See Chung, supra note 85, at 247 (criticizing Kerr’s argument about incentives
due to situations involving third-party possession of data including cloud
computing).
213. See Kerr, supra note 23, at 1658–59 (advocating a code-based approach to
avoid the overbreadth and vagueness concerns associated with a contract-based
approach to interpreting unauthorized access).
214. See Urban, supra note 202, at 1406–10 (proposing a fraud-based amendment
to the CFAA in order to realign the statute with the original focus on hackers and
outsiders); see also Darden, supra note 34, at 356, 359 (arguing that absent a
simplified approach to interpreting unauthorized access under the CFAA, Congress
needs to adopt an entirely new statute to cover post-access conduct such as
cyberbullying and online harassment).
215. See Kerr, supra note 23, at 1649 (“Access should be deemed ‘without
authorization’ only when it either violates the Morris intended function test, or else
uses false identification to trick the computer into granting the user greater
privileges.”).
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line between access without authorization and access in excess of
authorization, and it also fails to provide a remedy for cases of insider
216
By limiting the scope of unauthorized
misuse of information.
access to traditional notions of hacking for outsider cases and misuse
of information for insider cases, courts can promote the CFAA’s
original intent as an anti-hacking statute and address insider cases
217
without implicating the vagueness doctrine.
A. Legislative History Does not Unambiguously Support the Agency-,
Contract-, or Code-Based Approaches
As courts struggle to interpret the scope of authorized access under
the CFAA, judges often rely on legislative history for insight into
218
legislative purpose or intent.
Courts and commentators tend to
agree that instances of traditional hacking by “outsiders” present
relatively uncomplicated questions of unauthorized access liability, so
the focus of legislative history analysis often revolves around
219
discussion of insider liability.
This approach also makes sense for
evaluating mobile app data privacy cases, as apps gain access to user
data through user-download of the app and not some kind of forced
220
entry into the phone through malicious code.
Courts, however,
216. See Winn, supra note 76, at 1419 (arguing that the code-based approach is
“flatly inconsistent” with both the plain language of the statute and the 1996
legislative history).
217. The Supreme Court recently addressed the vagueness doctrine, albeit in the
context of the “honest-services” doctrine of mail- and wire-fraud statutes, by
articulating that concerns about constitutional vagueness necessitate a narrower
statutory construction. See Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010) (finding
the application of 18 U.S.C. § 1346 to bribery and kick-back schemes did not violate
either prong of the vagueness doctrine: (1) fair notice and (2) arbitrary and
discrimination prosecutions). In Skilling, the Court ultimately held that 18 U.S.C. §
1346—prohibiting wire fraud that causes harm in the form of the denial of the
“injured” party’s right to the offender’s “honest services” even though the betrayed
party suffered no deprivation of money or property—did not violate the vagueness
doctrine. Id. at 2933. Notably, the Court said that narrow and limited statutory
constructions must be considered prior to striking a federal statute as
unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 2929 (citing Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657
(1895)).
218. See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S.
CAL. L. REV. 845, 848–61 (1992) (discussing five reasons for turning to legislative
history to interpret a statute, including (1) avoiding an absurd result, (2) correcting
drafting errors, (3) deciphering specialized terms, (4) discerning the “reasonable
purpose” of a particular provision, and (5) deciding between competing “reasonable
purposes”).
219. See Field, supra note 110, at 831 (explaining that “outsider” liability—
traditional hackers breaking into computers—is clearly articulated in legislative
history, but the scope of “insider” access has been consistently unclear).
220. See Claire Cain Miller, For Hackers, The Next Lock to Pick: Companies See
Opportunity In Cellphone Security, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2011, at B1 (discussing how app
users can be tricked into downloading infected apps laden with malicious code, but
also noting the possibility of remote hacks similar to traditional computer break-ins).
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tend to use legislative history to merely support the approach that
221
they have already decided to adopt.
Early congressional discussions of insider liability arguably lend
222
some support to both agency- and contract-based interpretations.
Specifically, commentary surrounding the 1984 act suggests that
Congress wanted to preclude liability for access in furtherance of a
“legitimate business purpose . . . pursuant to an express or implied
authorization,” yet failed to clarify what would constitute a legitimate
223
business purpose.
Further, congressional discussions of the 1986
amendments focused on the “improper” nature of access, but still did
224
not detail how insiders were to ascertain what was, in fact, proper.
On one hand, discussions of “legitimate purposes” arguably lend
support for the agency-based view, which focuses on the amorphous
225
interests of a principal to define limits of the agent’s authorization.
By attempting to limit liability to only harmful, illegitimate purposes,
the legislative history supports the notion that Congress intended the
scope of authorization to be defined according to employer policies
226
or perhaps accepted norms of typical employee computer usage.
On the other hand, “legitimate business purposes” or the scope of
227
proper access could be clearly defined in some form of contract.
221. Shamrock Foods Co. v. Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d 962, 965 (D. Ariz. 2008) (relying
on legislative history to support a plain-meaning approach nearly identical to a codebased view); Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp.
2d 1121, 1127–29 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (utilizing legislative history to support the
agency-based approach and to “demonstrate the broad meaning and intended scope
of the terms ‘protected computer’ and ‘without authorization’”).
222. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 21 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689,
3707 (explaining that insider liability will not arise in instances of “information
incidentally obtained or . . . obtained legitimately,” and also “does not extend to any
type or form of computer access that is for a legitimate business purpose”); see also
Field, supra note 110, at 831 (explaining that congressional discussions suggested
that its understanding of authorization centered around the “purpose of access,”
which could fit with either the agency- or contract-based approach).
223. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 21, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3707
(explaining only that the CFAA is designed to “impose[] criminal sanctions upon
‘hackers’ and other criminals who access computers without authorization” but does
not extend to any “normal and customary business procedures and information
usage”).
224. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-612, at 7 (1986) (noting, without elaboration, that “[t]he
improper modifications, destructions or disclosures by authorized users . . . are
covered presently by [§ 1030(a)(3)]”).
225. H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 15, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3701
(articulating an exemption from criminal liability for “incidential [sic] use[s] of the
computer . . . [such as] do[ing] homework or play[ing] computer games”).
226. See Field, supra note 110, at 831–32 (explaining that the “original
understanding [of insider liability] was more on par with the agency-based or
contract-based interpretations later used by courts than the code-based
interpretations”).
227. See generally United States v. Phillips, 477 F.3d 215, 219–21 (5th Cir. 2007)
(noting that website owners can establish the extent to which the public may access
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However, the 1986 amendments also replaced notions of “purpose”
in the definition of “exceeds authorized access” with the current
language precluding access to information to which the accesser is
228
not “entitled.” This shift towards entitlement does little more than
confuse the issue further, as there is no indication of whether
entitlement is to be defined by some code-based limitations (i.e.
username/password), contractual provisions, or a broader concept of
229
employee loyalty.
Accordingly, legislative history lends some
support to each of the three interpretations and does not provide a
clear roadmap for which interpretation Congress intended to govern
the scope of authorized access.
B. The Shortcomings of Current Theories of Interpreting Authorization
Necessitate a Narrower View in Line with the Original Intent of the Statute as
an Anti-Hacking Law
While the broader agency- and contract-based approaches present
230
vagueness concerns and the code-based approach is inherently
231
under-inclusive, a narrower focus may be required to address
mobile apps cases arising under the CFAA.
By limiting
interpretations of without authorization to impose liability for
traditional hacking, such as the use of malicious code or various
232
social-engineering techniques, causes of action under the CFAA
may harmonize with the primary intent of the statute as an antiinformation on its website through some form of user agreement); EF Cultural
Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 582–84 (1st Cir. 2001) (same);
Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 245–46 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (same).
228. Compare Urban, supra note 202, at 1382 (describing the 1986 amendment to
CFAA with a definition of authorization focusing on the user’s purpose), with 18
U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) (2006) (defining exceeding authorized access as access to
information “that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter”).
229. Field, supra note 110, at 832.
230. See supra Parts II.A–B (describing the deficiencies of the contract- and agencybased approaches).
231. See supra Part II.C (describing the infirmities of the code-based approach in
blurring the distinction between “without authorization” and “exceeds authorized
access”).
232. One common social engineering technique is called “phishing,” which
entails a “virtual trap set by cyber-thieves that uses official-looking e-mails to lure [the
target] to fake websites and trick [the target] into revealing . . . personal
information,” and the variant called “spear-phishing” typically involves the criminal
having some inside information about the target in order to convince the target of
the authenticity of the fake email or website. Spear Phishers: Angling to Steal Your
Financial Info, FBI.GOV (Apr. 1, 2009), http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2009/april/
spearphishing_040109. For a detailed overview of social engineering techniques, see
Online Privacy, Social Networking, and Crime Victimization: Hearing before the Subcomm. on
Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 5–12
(July 28, 2010) (Remarks and Statement of Gordon M. Snow, Asst. Dir. Cyber
Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation).
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233

In the context of mobile app cases, this view
hacking provision.
shifts the focus of the liability analysis away from invariably divergent
interpretations of whether an app maker has an airtight privacy
234
policy or acts in accordance with the nebulous interests of a
235
multitude of users. Concurrently, by imposing liability on misuse of
information for insider cases, the CFAA would also address instances
of exceeding authorized access where data is obtained through nonpernicious and authorized means but ultimately used for harmful
purposes.
236
The putative class action case In re iPhone Application Litigation
presents an instructive scenario. Here, a class of Apple iPhone
owners alleged that they incurred damages as a result of certain
mobile applications accessing purportedly personal information,
237
including geo-location data, address book, and keystroke history.
The allegations further asserted that app developers and advertisers
gained access to this personal information both without and in excess
of authorization in violation of § 1030(a)(2)(C) and then profited
from the sale of users’ information for targeted advertising and
238
Applying the code-based approach,
marketing analytics purposes.
the class does not appear to have sufficient grounds to support an
unauthorized access claim, since there is no circumvention of any
239
code-based security measures.
Furthermore, the class appears to
only allege vague damages or losses of more than $5000 aggregating
over a one-year period, so the specific nature of the actual harm is

233. See S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 3 (1996) (articulating that the CFAA was “originally
enacted . . . to provide a clear statement of proscribed activity concerning . . . those
tempted to commit crimes by unauthorized access to computers” (emphasis added));
id. at 7 (noting that “subsection 1030(a)(2)(C) is intended to protect against the
interstate or foreign theft of information by computer” (emphasis added)); S. REP.
NO. 101-544, at 4–5 (1990) (explaining that the CFAA’s private right of action was
intended to redress serious computer abuse by outsiders); S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 4
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2482 (asserting that the CFAA was
“aimed at deterring and punishing certain ‘high tech’ crimes”).
234. See supra notes 169–70 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties of
employing privacy policies as the foundation for CFAA liability).
235. See supra notes 183–84 and accompanying text (discussing the propensity for
arbitrary enforcement when employing users’ interests as the basis for defining the
scope of authorization).
236. No. 11-MD-02250-LHK, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106865 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20,
2011).
237. Id. at *9.
238. Id. at *9–10.
239. The class alleged that mobile advertisers obtained information from the
user’s phone after the user initiated and completed the download of an app. Second
Amended Complaint at 3–5, iPhone Application Litig., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106865
(No. 11-MD-02250-LHK). The complaint does not, however, make any mention of
code-based restrictions in place to safeguard the purportedly personal information.
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unclear and may only be the existence of more highly-targeted
240
banner advertisements.
Judge Koh recognized these concerns and dismissed the
complaint, with leave to amend, for three reasons: (1) negligent
software design is insufficient to support a CFAA claim; (2) users did
not sufficiently allege that the defendants accessed their phones
“without authorization” or that the defendants “exceed authorized
access” by accessing their phones; and (3) app users have failed to
241
identify specific economic damages.
The rationale behind this
second deficiency in the complaint is particularly instructive, namely
that the voluntary nature of the user’s download of the app effectively
242
precludes a “without authorization” claim. This reasoning supports
the idea that the CFAA should be limited to traditional hacking cases
in the context of mobile apps, as the court appears to imply that only
forcible intrusions into users’ phones, like involuntarily downloaded
243
apps, will support a “without authorization” claim.
Concurrently,
the court left open the possibility that a claim against an app
developer could still exist for accessing data in excess of
authorization, but such a claim would require a specific harm to the
user caused by the developer’s access and not merely a generalized
244
claim of privacy infringement.
Rather than continually expanding the CFAA to address specific
240. Id. at 10.
241. iPhone Application Litig., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106865, at *35–37. Notably,
Judge Koh used LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009), for the
definitions of “without authorization” and “exceeds authorized access,” reliance on
which indicates that the court would reject the agency-based approach. iPhone
Application Litig., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106865, at *39.
242. See iPhone Application Litig., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106865, at *35–36 (citing In
re Apple & ATTM Antitrust Litig., No. C 07-05152-JW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98270,
at *26 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2010)) (emphasizing that “voluntary installation runs
counter to the notion that the alleged act was a trespass and to the CFAA’s
requirement that the alleged act was ‘without authorization’ as well as the CPC’s
requirement that the act was ‘without permission’” (emphasis added)). Even in cases
of voluntary download, there are numerous instances of apps accessing data on
mobile devices beyond what was initially allowed in end user permissions. See supra
note 21 (collecting cases involving allegations that apps, although voluntarily
downloaded, improperly accessed personal information on a user’s phone).
243. iPhone Application Litig., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106865, at *35–36; see also La
Court v. Specific Media, No. SACV 10-1256-GW(JCGx), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50543,
at *17–18 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2011) (rejecting a similar data-privacy-based claim for
failing to allege specific damages and unsuccessfully demonstrating that defendant
intended damage to plaintiff’s computers by inserting tracking cookies).
244. See iPhone Application Litig., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106865, at *36–37 (citing
Bose v. Interclick, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 9183 (DAB), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93663, at *12–
14 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2011)) (explaining that collection of personal information for
advertising purposes, even if conducted “without permission,” is insufficient to
support a CFAA claim, but recognizing that identification of a “single act of harm”
plus a showing of economic damage could suffice).
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problems that happen to occur in the mobile space, utilizing other
statutes may be a more effective means of combating certain types of
abuses. For cases involving privacy interests of children, the
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) affords specific
245
remedies.
Indeed, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is now
seeking to explicitly include mobile privacy cases involving children
under the age of thirteen within COPPA and the FTC’s COPPA
246
Rule.
Further, the FTC’s COPPA enforcement efforts leave little
247
doubt that COPPA applies to mobile apps. For identity theft claims,
the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998 offers a
248
more tailored means of prosecution and recovery. Cases involving
privacy infringement associated with mobile messaging can be
249
Other claims related to
addressed through the Wiretap Act.
improper access to voicemail or e-mail are covered under the Stored
250
Communications Act.
Phishing cases involving mobile apps that
steal bank account or credit card numbers are covered under the
251
federal statute that governs access device fraud.
E-mail or other
commercial advertisement spam claims that occur through mobile
252
apps can be addressed through the CAN-SPAM Act. Each of these
statutes is highly tailored to specific types of conduct, and application
to the mobile space does not require the same kind of creative
interpretive techniques as under the CFAA.
From a normative perspective, criminal and civil liability under the
253
CFAA makes sense for traditional hackers or fraudsters.
However,
245. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–05 (2006).
246. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 59,804 (proposed
Sept. 27, 2011) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 312).
247. See Consent Decree & Order at 2–4, United States v. W3 Innovations, LLC,
No. CV-11-03958-PSG, FTC File No. 102 3251 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2011), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1023251/110908w3order.pdf (settling charges under
COPPA and the FTC’s COPPA rule that the defendant illegally collected—via a
mobile app—and disclosed personal information from tens of thousands of children
under the age of thirteen without their parents’ prior consent).
248. 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2006). For example, § 1028(a)(7) makes it a federal crime
to “knowingly transfer . . . or use[], without lawful authority, a means of
identification of another person with the intent to commit, or to aid or abet, . . . any
unlawful activity [that violates Federal, State, or local law],” where “means of
communication” explicitly includes telecommunication identifying information. Id.
§ 1028(a)(7); see also The Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act, 18 U.S.C. §
1028A (2006) (imposing heightened penalties for aggravated identity theft when a
defendant commits identify theft in relation to a variety of felony offenses).
249. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a)–(b) (2006).
250. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2006).
251. 18 U.S.C. § 1029 (2006).
252. 18 U.S.C. § 1037 (2006).
253. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1265 (11th Cir. 2010)
(affirming the conviction of a Social Security Administration teleservices agent who
accessed the SSA database to obtain information about women in whom he was
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when the end result is only slightly more targeted advertisements on a
254
cell phone app to which some users take offense, imposing criminal
and civil liability does not comport with either the intent of the
statute or sound public policy.
C. Proposed Amendments to the CFAA
After sixteen years without substantive change and numerous
conflicting judicial opinions, the CFAA is ripe for amendments aimed
at limiting its scope and clarifying its ambiguities. Amidst growing
concerns that the CFAA is overbroad and vague, the 112th Congress
255
considered proposed amendments to the CFAA.
In September
2011,
the
Senate
Judiciary
Committee
approved
the
Grassley/Franken Amendment to Senator Leahy’s Personal Data
Privacy and Security Act to change the definition of “exceeds
256
authorized access” in § 1030(e)(6). Specifically, the proposed
amendment would strike the word “alter” and insert the following:
alter, but does not include access in violation of a contractual
obligation or agreement, such as an acceptable use policy or terms
of service agreement, with an Internet service provider, Internet
website, or non-government employer, if such violation constitutes
the sole basis for determining that access to a protected computer
257
is unauthorized.

The Bono Mack amendment introduced as part of the SECURE IT
258
Act mirrors this language verbatim. These amendments appear to
add much needed clarity to the “exceeds authorized access”
romantically interested, and then pursued those women through disquieting phone
calls or unannounced home visits); United States v. Ivanov, 175 F. Supp. 2d 367, 373–
75 (D. Conn. 2001) (denying a motion to dismiss filed by the defendant, a Russian
hacker, who allegedly violated the CFAA by stealing network passwords and
attempting to extort money from the company in exchange for making their network
secure again).
254. See In re iPhone Application Litig., No. 11-MD-02250-LHK, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 106865, at *9–10 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011) (describing allegations that
defendants “exploit[ed]” purportedly personal information for “advertising and
analytics purposes”).
255. See Personal Data Privacy and Security Act, S. REP. NO. 112-91, at 10–12
(2011) (discussing the amendments proposed by Senator Grassley and Senator
Leahy on September 15 and November 17, 2011, respectively). In addition,
Representative Bono Mack introduced a similar bill in the United States House of
Representatives. Strengthening and Enhancing Cybersecurity by Using Research,
Education, Information, and Technology Act of 2012 (SECURE IT Act of 2012),
H.R. 4263, 112th Cong. (introduced Mar. 27, 2012 by Rep. Bono Mack).
256. See S. REP. NO. 112-91, at 11–12 (discussing the five proposed amendments to
the Act as amended by the Senate Commission on the Judiciary).
257. Id. at 43.
258. Compare S. REP. NO. 112-90, at 10–12 (2011) (incorporating the Grassley
amendment over the Leahy amendment), with SECURE IT Act of 2012, H.R. 4263,
112th Cong. (recommending identical language).
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definition and essentially prevent the Department of Justice from
pursuing the Drew-type litigation. By specifically excluding violations
of written access agreements that form the sole basis for determining
access, the amendments appear to solve the core overbreadth and
vagueness issues that plague the contract-based approach by
259
removing the possibility of criminalizing a breach of contract.
Moreover, these amendments take the power of determining the line
for criminal liability away from drafters of often arbitrary or
nonsensical terms of use policies. In other words, these small
amendments remove the potential for prosecuting ordinary Internet
usage as felonies.
In November 2011, Senator Leahy introduced a revised
amendment that would rewrite § 1030(A)(2) by defining the specific
types of information that would have to be obtained in excess of
260
authorization in order to trigger liability.
Specifically, the
amendment would create liability only when the offense “involves”
certain types of personally identifiable information, including
“government-issued identification numbers . . . trade secrets,
261
commercial business information, or other similar information.”
This amendment, though aimed at providing broader protections for
personal data, does not seem to address the core issues of
overbreadth and vagueness. The use of phrases such as “involve” and
“other similar information” likely will not provide sufficient clarity
262
and may lead to further confusion. While limiting liability to only
specific types of information may be a valid way of solving the
frivolous prosecution problem, the Leahy amendment attempts to
259. See Bill Tweaked in Senate: Terms of Service No Longer Terms of Felony, CTR. FOR
DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.cdt.org/blogs/joshuagruenspecht/169senate-tweaks-bill-terms-service-no-longer-terms-felony (discussing
how the revised bill would remove “contractual fine print . . . criminal liability,” but
noting that several senators suggested an alternate approach involving a revision of
DOJ guidelines for such cases instead of a statutory fix).
260. See supra note 255 (discussing proposed bills in the House and the Senate).
Senator Leahy’s amendments were loosely based on a proposal by Professor Kerr
articulated during House testimony. See Cyber Security: Protecting America’s New
Frontier: Hearing before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 6–8 (Nov. 15, 2011)
(testimony of Orin S. Kerr) (advocating for the Grassley/Franken amendment while
also proposing an alternative, though more restricted, version of the Leahy
amendment).
261. Orin Kerr, My Assessment of Senator Leahy’s Proposed Amendment to the CFAA,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 22, 2011, 5:53 PM), http://volokh.com/2011/11/22/myassessment-of-senator-leahys-proposed-amendment-to-the-cfaa/.
262. See id. (arguing that while the idea of limiting the type of liability-triggering
information is “sensible,” the Leahy amendment uses overly broad and ambiguous
language that not only may raise more interpretive problems than it solves, but also
that it fails to expressly prohibit the prosecution of Drew-type terms of service
violations).
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expand personal data protections to cover too many issues under one
263
umbrella.
The recent legislative activity surrounding the CFAA demonstrates,
at least in part, congressional recognition that the decades-old antihacking statue is in need of a face-lift. Although the Leahy
amendment arguably raises more problems than it solves, it
represents a step in the right direction towards limiting the scope of
arguably vague provisions.
CONCLUSION
The CFAA has broken free of its moorings as an anti-hacking law
and now sits on the precipice of becoming an oppressively broad
statute when applied to mobile app cases. Application of the
contract- and agency-based approaches raises vagueness concerns
involving both fair notice and the potential for arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement. Concurrently, the under-inclusive codebased approach blurs the CFAA’s clear distinction between insider
and outsider liability. Accordingly, courts should limit “without
authorization” liability to traditional hacking cases to promote the
original intent of the statute, while “exceeds authorized access”
claims should be similarly limited to instances of serious misuse of
information. Moreover, absent congressional or judicial clarification,
specific problems such as children’s privacy, identity theft, or mobile
messaging are better addressed through more highly-targeted and
narrowly-tailored statutes.
Despite the uncertainty surrounding the scope of unauthorized
access, lawmakers and regulators continue to propose CFAA
264
amendments to impose increasingly harsh penalties.
Raising
penalties, including making it easier for law enforcement to bring
felony charges, without first addressing the underlying vagueness
concerns and definitional ambiguities, is a recipe for arbitrary
265
enforcement. Even as these proposals percolate through Congress,
263. See id. (discussing how the inclusion of “trade secrets” in the Leahy
amendment has the potential to circumvent the intent requirement for trade secret
theft liability under 18 U.S.C. § 1832).
264. See Personal Data Privacy and Security Act, S. REP. NO. 112-91, at 13–14
(2011) (proposing harsher penalties for specific crimes, such as password-trafficking,
but also attempting to carve out a prosecutorial exemption for violations of website
terms of service agreements that form the sole basis of an unauthorized access
claim).
265. See Remarks of Orin Kerr, Federalist Society Cybersecurity Symposium (June
28, 2011), available at http://volokh.com/2011/07/05/federalist-society-symposiumon-cybersecurity/ (criticizing proposed CFAA amendments as opening a Pandora’s
box for law enforcement to bring unauthorized access cases on a whim).
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several lawmakers have recognized the problems inherent in applying
266
the current state of the CFAA to mobile applications.
As mobile apps present new challenges of data privacy for endusers, app developers, and law enforcement, courts can adopt a
narrower interpretation of unauthorized access limited to instances
of hacking or serious misuse of user-data until Congress offers more
highly tailored legislation. In the interim, causes of action against
mobile app developers and advertisers should fail under any current
interpretation of “without authorization” or “exceeds authorized
access” absent evidence of hacking or serious information misuse. By
limiting the scope of CFAA liability through narrow interpretations,
courts can avoid vagueness concerns and potentially limitless liability
for the mobile data field.

266. See Letter from United States Sens. Al Franken and Richard Blumenthal to
Assistant Att’y Gen. Breuer (Apr. 12, 2011), available at http://franken.senate.gov/
files/letter/041112_Franken_Blumenthal_Letter_AG_Breuer_CFAA.pdf (“Because
many smartphone apps lack privacy policies, many of the applications being
investigated by the U.S. Attorney General’s Office may fall into this legal gray area.”).

